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ALBERT E. UTTON*

In Search of An Integrating
Principle For Interstate Water Law:
Regulation versus the Market Place
The development of interstate groundwater law is at a beginning stage,
and two legal theories are competing for the favor of the courts in settling
interstate water disputes. The two approaches are commerce clause analysis, on the one hand, and equitable apportionment on the other. The
United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that the doctrine of
equitable apportionment "governs" disputes regarding interstate streamsl
and almost simultaneously held, in another case, that the commerce clause
governs interstate groundwaters. 2
The allocation of interstate surface flows is not new, and is well settled
in a long line of cases developed over the better part of a century. The
allocation of interstate groundwaters is new, and the development of its
legal doctrine is in a pioneering stage. In this development with two
contending theories, one might say that one theory, that of the commerce
clause, is a market approach, and that the other is something of a regulatory concept. It is regulatory in that it regulates or limits the market
by allocating shares to states or regions which, in turn, allows the states
or regions to plan for the future based upon these allocations. A tension
exists between the idea of the efficiency of the free market in distributing
goods and services versus the need to protect some values through regulation and planning; in the two concepts the ideas of efficiency versus
equity are contending once again. Often the pure market place must be
tempered by some regulation, because the market place may not protect
factors or equities whose dollar value is difficult to ascertain but which
are important nonetheless. Anti-trust legislation guards against monopolistic tendencies. Zoning ordinances inject considerations of light, space,
and population density into land use decisions; environmental laws restrain pollution of water and air by industry; and consumer protection
laws regulate the market in order to ensure that manufacturers comply
with quality and safety standards.
This article will suggest that a market place concept may not be the
best approach for interstate water allocation. Rather, it will suggest that
*Professor of Law; Editor-in-Chief, Natural Resources Journal; Co-Director, Natural Resources
Center, The University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Vermejo 1].
2. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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the regulatory approach, using the device of equitable apportionment,
may be best in order to protect the balance within the federal union of
states and to ensure the stability necessary for state and regional water
planning. In addition, in view of the apparent fragmentation of interstate
water law, with one law for interstate surface waters, and one for interstate
groundwaters, this paper will propose a possible approach leading to an
integrated interstate water law. It will suggest that the law of surface and
groundwaters can be successfully unified into an effective law of interstate
water allocation which will also protect balance within the federation.
The Tale of Three Cases and Two Theories
To understand the interplay of the theories of equitable apportionment
and the commerce clause, it helps to look at three important cases involving water issues, two decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and one by the federal district court of New Mexico. In July 1982,
the Supreme Court decided Sporhase v. Nebraska3 which dealt with the
transfer of groundwater across a state line from Nebraska to Colorado.
In December 1982, the Supreme Court decided Coloradov. New Mexico,4
which dealt with a dispute over an interstate stream, the Vermejo River,
which flows from Colorado into New Mexico. In January 1983, a federal
district court decided El Paso v. Reynolds5 which deals with the transfer
across the state line from New Mexico to Texas of groundwater which
is interconnected to an interstate stream.
The first groundwater case, Sporhase, said the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution applied to groundwater, so that Nebraska could not
forbid the export of groundwater across a state line into another state.
The Vermejo case declared that the doctrine of equitable apportionment
"governs" disputes over interstate streams, whereby waters of the stream
are divided so each state is allocated a fair share of the stream.
The Court is at a crossroads. Its interstate water law is at odds with
its interstate commerce law. This disparate treatment of interstate waters
not only defies the laws of hydrology, but also raises the question of what
principle should govern, the forces of the market place or the ideas of
planning and regulation.
Policy Similarities and Differences of Equitable Apportionment and the
Commerce Clause
Both the commerce clause and the doctrine of equitable apportionment
are concepts for maintaining the critical inner balance of the federal union.
3. Id.
4. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
5. 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983).
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Equitable apportionment is a doctrine which the courts have fashioned
to maintain the balance between states by "dividing the pie" of an interstate stream between the states that share it. 6 Thus, the doctrine assures
each state of a fair share and prevents any state, simply because it is
upstream, bigger, more economically advanced, or more aggressive, from
taking more than its share of the river. Under equitable apportionment,
the court is called upon to settle disputes between states "in such a way
as will recognize the equal rights of both and at the same time establish
justice between them." 7 In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the court added that
equitable apportionment demands "the delicate adjustment" of the interests of the states. 8
The commerce clause protects the national union from being economically fragmented and thus weakened by individual states imposing burdensome measures, such as taxes or tariffs or bans on goods, which would
impede commerce. 9 Equitable apportionment, on the other hand, recognizes the "delicate adjustment' '0 of the "interests of quasi-sovereigns""
and "equal rights of both" 2 while attempting to establish justice between
them. In the delicate balance of federalism, the commerce clause protects
the national economy from being "balkanized," but in interstate water
disputes the Court recognizes the interests of individual states and uses
the doctrine of equitable apportionment to protect and accommodate the
separate interests of individual states.
If there is a dispute between two states over interstate rivers and interdependent groundwaters, it is settled by allocating to each a fair shareequitable apportionment. " Then that state can plan, allocate, and use its
water resources in a rational manner for the future, as well as the present.
Without the knowledge of how much water it is entitled to, a state loses
the ability to prudently manage water resources over time. Equitable
apportionment requires consideration of "future uses," 4 waste and conservation, ' and "long-range planning. " 6 Thus, equitable apportionment
6. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
7. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 6, 97-98 (1907).
8. 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). In Vermejo I the Supreme Court said the doctrine of equitable
apportionment is a "flexible doctrine which calls for ... 'consideration of many factors' to secure
a just and equitable allocation." Vermejo 1, at 183.
9. Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Federalism, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSnTUTIONAL LAW
185 (Nathaniel Nathanson, ed. 1963).
10. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
I1. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
12. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 6, 97-98 (1907).
13. That fair share can be as little as zero. In Colorado v. New Mexico, -. U.S.-.; 104 S. Ct.
2433, 2441 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Vermejo II], the Court, after considering the equities, rejected
"the notion that the mere fact that the Vermejo originates in Colorado automatically entitles Colorado
to a share of the river's waters." Vermejo II, at 2442.
14. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 190 (1982).
15. Id. at 185.
16. Vermejo II at 2441.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

in its consideration of economic development, water planning, efficient
use, conservation, and the preservation of balance between states, is
regulatory in nature. The commerce clause is, in contrast, based on the
free trading concepts of the market. Both concepts serve as limitations
on what a state can do within its own borders within the context of the
federal union. Equitable apportionment limits what a state can do in regard
to transboundary water resources flowing through its territory; ordinarily,
it cannot take all of the flow of a river, for example, just because it flows
in that state. Also, under the commerce clause, a state is limited in what
it can do within its boundaries. A state may not enact tariffs, taxes, or
regulations which would impede the flow of articles in commerce between
the states of the federation. "
However, in spite of similar policy goals of limiting the sovereignty
of individual states, there is the potential for a basic conflict between the
commerce clause and equitable apportionment. Although both doctrines
are ways of limiting the unbridled power of individual states, their conceptual goals are located at opposite poles of the federal design. Equitable
apportionment recognizes and respects the territorial integrity and quasisovereignty of individual states, but limits that quasi-sovereignty so as
to accommodate the competing needs of other states or quasi-sovereigns.
It seeks balance between states. Equitable apportionment respects state
lines, but limits what can be done within them. Commerce clause analysis
tends to erase state lines. 8
Commerce clause analysis favors those states with the greatest economic power and, in the case of water, it is a single-edged sword which
protects the state wanting to take water from another. Equitable apportionment, on the other hand, is a double-edged sword which protects both
states and allocates to each an equitable share of interstate water resources.

Contemporary Climate of Opinion and the Commerce Clause
One certainty is that in the current climate of opinion, in which commerce clause analysis seems to be in the ascendency, every premise of
apportionment will be challenged and scrutinized closely. 9 The commerce
clause analysis threatens to sweep over the basic assumptions of equitable
apportionment and either greatly modify the doctrine or eliminate it com17. See, e.g., Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism,the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State Owned
Resources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71, 78 (1980); Varat, State Citizenship and Interstate Equality, 48 U.
Cm. L. REv. 487, 518 (1981).
18. Varat, State Citizenship and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Cm. L. Rev. 487, 518 (1981).
19. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mont.
1983), aff'd, F.2d (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1985), for example, challenges an interstate compact on
dormant commerce clause grounds.
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pletely. This is because apportionment in its most basic expression recognizes land and water as essential to the territorial integrity of each state
and, in so doing, honors the quasi-sovereignty of the individual state.
This, in turn, is grounded in the importance of balance and equity between
member states in the federation. While equitable apportionment stands
as a bulwark to the integrity of individual states, in so doing it also stands
as an obstacle to the free market forces of deregulation which have
contemporary momentum in the land. On the other hand, the forces of
deregulation would have a largely unrestrained market determine policy
and allocate resources in the name of efficiency.
Commerce clause analysis might mean that the unrestrained big fish
will eat the small fish in a largely unregulated environment. But it might
be argued in our context that even though the viability of states as constituent communities might be undermined, greater efficiency would result
for the nation as a whole. This climate of opinion is reflected in other
contexts, and is seen in the popularity of the deregulation of activities
varying from transportation, as in the case of buses and airlines; communications, as in the dismantling of AT&T; and even in the televising
of college football. The theory is, let the market determine for the greater
good of all through greater efficiency.
However, in the context of interstate water resources the principle of
"let the market determine" may threaten the territorial integrity of individual states and, therefore, the balance of those states within the federal
union, thus weakening one of the foundation stones of federalism. The
market theory would, in its simplest terms, largely allow states to determine unilaterally their own share of water resources, based on how advanced they are economically.
It may be that inscrutable economic forces of the marketplace, under
the commerce clause, will lead to greater efficiency and production of
greater wealth. It may be that efficiency would dictate that individual
states should become regional sacrifice areas to provide the water to fuel
the further economic development of the more economically advanced.
It may be that individual states should be able to unilaterally determine
their share of the use of water resources based on their stage of economic
development. However, if there is merit to the idea of the founding fathers
that it is desirable to maintain balance between member states, if there
is merit to the idea that diversity contributes to a strong economy, and if
there is value in the suggestion that viable constituent parts contribute to
a stronger federation, then perhaps it is appropriate to design a doctrine
of interstate water allocation which, while limiting the territorial sovereignty of individual states, recognizes the territorial integrity of member
states and equitably balances their competing needs in the case of interstate
water resources.
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Thomas Jefferson spoke of the "beautiful equilibrium '21 of the federal
union. His words still carry modem relevance. "The enlightened statesmen ... will endeavor to preserve the weight and influence of every

part [of the Union] as too much given to any member of it would destroy
the general equilibrium." 21 Perhaps, then, it becomes appropriate to ask
questions like: why should a state more advanced economically be permitted to take water away from a less economically developed state simply
because that state's time of economic development is yet to come? Should
not equity provide for the future uses of states developing at a slower
pace? Perhaps it is relevant to suggest that no state should be able to
determine unilaterally its share of transboundary waters because of either
superior economic or geographic position.
The fundamental question is not what legal doctrines should apply per
se, but rather what policies should be followed in order to use the resources
wisely and fairly and, at the same time, protect the equilibrium of the
federation. Thus the question perhaps is best put-what legal doctrine
best promotes these policies? The law of interstate streams may be better
than the law of interstate commerce. Equitable apportionment, although
not perfect, may be better than the commerce clause for a number of
reasons. Equitable apportionment avoids unilateral allocations due to factors such as superior geographic or economic position which would be
encouraged by the commerce clause approach. In addition, it:
1) provides fairness. It normally requires sharing, 22 and the share
must be equitable, based on a range of considerations including
economic development and alternative sources;
2) assures stability. Long range planning and husbandry of the resource are possible because each party has a secure share. 23 This
security avoids "tragedies of the commons" which result from
races to the bottom of the aquifer
24 in a "he who gets there firstest
gets the mostest" competition;

3) strengthens federalism. A sharing of the water resource is better
20. 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3 (published by the Thomas Jefferson Memorial
Assoc., Washington, D.C. 1903) (Letter to Peregrine Fitzhugh, Esq., Philadelphia, Feb. 23, 1798).
21. Id.
22. The word normally is used because the balancing of equities may give a zero share to one
state as in the case of Vermejo II, at 2433.
23. In New Mexico, for example, DuMars points to "the possibility of competition from unrestricted out-of-state demand" placing great stress on "long-range planning and management," and
may make the task "formidable, if not impossible." DuMars, New Mexico Water Law: An Overview
and Discussion of Current Issues, 22 NAT. RES. J. 1045, 1058, 1062 (1982).
24. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water Rights, in
ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC POLICY IN WATER RESOURcEs DEVELOPMENT 251-71 (S.Smith & E. Castle

eds. 1964); Veeman, Water Policy and Institutions in Northern India: The Case of Groundwater
Rights, 18 NAT. RES. J. 569 (1978); Hansen, Economic Growth Patterns in the Texas Borderlands,
22 NAT. RES. J. 805, 819 (1982).
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federalism and better for the parties. By requiring sharing, the
balance between member states is strengthened and the integrity
of the individual members of the federation is protected.

Under the Constitution, a state has a right to continue to exist. The
Constitution protects the territorial integrity of the states.25 But in many
arid states, these constitutional protections may be of little solace and the
territorial land base may be of limited utility without the appurtenant
water to make it productive.
This brings us quite clearly to the underlying foundation of equitable
apportionment-that is, land and water are part of the territorial base of
a state. Land and water are necessaries for the existence of a state. In a
phrase, land and water are not just articles of commerce, they are basic
to the viability of the state itself. Equitable apportionment recognizes this
fact, and provides a mechanism for dealing with these resources when
they become extraterritorial in extent, i.e., when they extend across a
political boundary, by requiring sharing in an equitable way, by prohibiting unilateral allocations or actions which would have significant, adverse transboundary impacts.
Water as Essential to the Preservationof Societies
Water has been treated as essential to the territorial integrity of a state
for a number of reasons including: its nonsubstitutability, 6 its importance
for life itself,27 and the central role it plays in economic and social
development which form the fabric of the very concept of community.
Water is not only essential for biological life, but it is also essential for
25. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 185. One writer states it even more strongly: "[p]rinciples of
federalism do not tolerate 'ghost states'"... "Rather, a state has a duty to its citizens to continue
to exercise the powers reserved to it under the tenth amendment-it cannot constitutionally go out
of business." DuMars, Evaluating CongressionalLimits on a State's Severance Tax Equity Interest
in Its Natural Resources: An Essential Responsibility for the Supreme Court, 22 NAT. REs. J. 673,
680 (1982).
26. Other materials often cannot be substituted for water at all, or at most to a limited extent.
For example, if a state does not have petroleum resources, other energy sources such as the sun, or
wood, may serve as substitutes. If copper is in short supply, aluminum or silicon can be substituted
for electrical conduction. In contrast, there is little or no substitute for water for many of its uses.
A state can survive without gold or petroleum, but it cannot survive without water. See Bonem &
Brown, Some Remarks on the Role of Markets in Managing Western Water, presented to the Select
Committee on Water Marketing of the Montana Legislature (July 14, 1984).
27. Thales of Miletus, one of the seven wise men of ancient Greece, declared "water is the basis
and original stuff from which everything comes and to which everything returns." Cited by B.
CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF WATER LAW DisPuTEs IN INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINs 32 (1981).
Water functions as the basis for all life. Chauhan makes the point "not only that life started in water
but rather water is life itself and is essential for earthly life, as living cells live in water and water
is flowing through us all the time, entering as food and drink and as such participating in virtually
every process that occurs in plant and animal organisms." Id.
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the social existence of communities, be they remote villages or constituent
states of a national federation. "The story of man
28 can be narrated in
terms of his struggle for water and his use of it.,
The early civilizations arose in the valleys of the great rivers, such as
the Nile in Egypt, the Tigris-Euphrates of Mesopotamia, the Indus of
India, the Hwang Ho of China. Europe's history throughout the centuries
has been tied to the Rhine, -the Danube, and the Seine.29 Caponera points
out that "[r]ivers have always been the center and heart of all civilizations." 3 ° Man's success or failure has depended on his relationship to
water. Chauhan observes that: "water has throughout history been the
major determinant of the fate of any culture and the use of water by man
is a part and parcel of his culture and, as such, is woven into his social
and economic way of living." 3 ' He adds that water is important "in the
economic development of the States" which, in turn "affects the social
development." 3 2 The great civilizations of the Nile, the Euphrates, the
Indus, and the Hwang Ho, blessed with water "blossomed with progress
and prosperity, but crumbled into deserts and deteriorated when their
water systems deteriorated or failed." 3 3
In sum, water is not only essential for biological survival, but a necessary prerequisite for the development and maintenance of the economy
and social structure which make a society possible. Water is not just a
commodity; it is a central imperative for the survival, maintenance, and
continuity of living communities, including states of a federal union. For
analysis under the commerce clause to perceive water as merely an article
of commerce ignores to some extent the history of the "man-water relationship." It does not take cognizance of the fundamental importance
of water for the economic existence of states from which water is taken.
Perhaps more precisely, commerce clause analysis is one-sided in its
approach. It provides protection to the taking state, but does not provide
adequate protection to the state from which the water is taken. There are
at least two sides to be considered: water for the growth of the taking
state, and water for the maintenance and growth of the state from which
water is taken. In short, commerce clause analysis does not assure the
less economically powerful state an equitable share. It does not protect
balance between states within the federal concept.
The court in the El Paso case observed that nearly "every aspect of
the public welfare has economic overtones" 34 but nonetheless did not
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 27.
Id.
Report of the 48th Conference of the Int'l L. Ass'n. 50 (1958).
Chauhan, supra note 27, at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 45.
El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
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allow the state from which water is taken to keep water for the health of
its economy. Therefore, the court did not recognize the central role of
water in the maintenance of communities through their inextricably related
economies in both the taking state and the state from which water is
taken. The viability of individual states may be threatened if the major
limits on what water may be taken from a state or region are those of
geography and economics. Given technological change, these limits of
geography and hydrology may be less inhibiting. Without legal protections, constituent member states and regions may be somewhat naked
before the winds of superior economic power.35 Land and water are
essential to the integrity of the state. They are essential for the physical
survival of a state's inhabitants, and the economic survival of the state
itself. Thus, in turn, they are essential for the maintenance of the constituent parts of the federation. Land and water are essential for both life
itself and the viability of the societal components of the federation. This
viability may be threatened if individual states are vulnerable to the
unrestrained demands of states with superior economic power.
Incongruities:A Tale of Two States and Three Maps
In addition to the question of balance within the federation, there is
the question of the apparent conflict between interstate surface water law
and interstate groundwater law. Perhaps to illustrate the incongruities of
the current interstate water law, it might be helpful to look at different
scenarios suggested by the Sporhase case itself. Scenario 1 is a rather
oversimplified version of the actual Sporhase case, and Scenarios 2 and
3 are hypothetical situations in which the physical details are varied
slightly so as to illustrate a different result, depending on whether the
commerce clause or equitable apportionment cases are cited.
Scenario 1: Sporhase v. Nebraska
Joy Sporhase has a farm which straddles the Colorado-Nebraska boundary. He drills a well on his farm in Nebraska and transports part of that
water across the boundary to Colorado for irrigating that part of his farm
which lies in Colorado. Nebraska has a law forbidding the export of
Nebraska groundwater unless certain conditions are satisfied, such as the
requirement that the receiving state also allows the export of its groundwater. Colorado does not. Nebraska attempts to enforce its "non-export"
statute. The Court says Nebraska cannot constitutionally restrict the export
of its groundwater because such a restriction would be a burden on
interstate commerce and, thereby, violates the commerce clause.
35. Without legal protection there might be the suggestion that some states might face the prospect
of becoming "ghost states." DuMars, supra note 18, at 680.
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Figure IS
Sporhase v. Nebraska
1) Commerce clause applies.
2) Colorado can take all it wants, subject to some
considerations such as conservation and public
interest.

IorhaseF

F

well

Scenario 2: Nebraska v. Colorado
Rather than putting the well in Nebraska, Joy Sporhase places the well
in Colorado, and begins pumping. The drawdown causes a cone of depression in the aquifer around the well and eventually starts drawing water
from Nebraska, thereby affecting the aquifer in Nebraska. Nebraska responds by invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
cites the long line of cases which call for equitable apportionment when
action in one state "reaches through the agency of natural laws into the
territory of another state." 3 6 Nebraska adds that Sporhase's pumping of
water "would be a taking" 37 from the adjacent territory of Nebraska and
that "the controversy, therefore, rises above a mere question of local
private right and involves a matter of state interest." 3 8
Therefore, the dispute should be settled on the basis of "equality of
rights" of the respective states.39 Under this scenario, using the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in interstate surface water cases, it appears that
equitable apportionment would apply and each state would be allocated
a share of the uses of the aquifer.
Colo. I Neb.
Sporhase Farm

Figure 2
Nebraska v. Colorado
1) Equitable apportionment applies.
2) Each state is allocated a share.

well

Scenario 3: Colorado v. Nebraska
Rather than a well, there is a spring on the Sporhase farm in Nebraska
which feeds a stream that flows into Colorado. Under this scenario,
Nebraska plans to put a small dam across the stream to divert all or part
of the water for use in Nebraska.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1902).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In this case, Colorado cites the equitable apportionment cases as in
Scenario 2 because, even though the action is in Nebraska it has impact
in Colorado by depriving Colorado of the "beneficial effects of a flowing
stream." 4" Therefore, Colorado invokes the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to determine the "relative rights of these states in the
waters of this interstate stream. . ."" using the doctrine of equitable
apportionment which governs such interstate water disputes.
Colo.

Neb.

Sporhase Farm

Figure 3
Colorado v. Nebraska

1) Equitable apportionment applies.
2) Each state receives a share.

1
o
d

These scenarios would be a possible thumbnail summary of interstate
water law. One might use a number of adjectives to describe this situation,
but it is doubtful if the list of adjectives would include words such as
consistent, cohesive, unified, integrated, or rational.
Why is the law "governing" interstate groundwater so at odds with
that governing interstate surface water? Is it because interstate surface
waters are basically governed by the law of gravity; that is, because of
being upstream, the upper riparian state had the geographical advantage
and, therefore, the doctrine of equitable apportionment was marshalled
to protect the lower riparian from the excesses of the upstream neighbor?
Is it because the effects of surface water diversion are more obvious and
the need for equitable apportionment or interstate compacts more readily
perceived? Could the explanation be that groundwater development was
later in time, or that the effects of withdrawals are out of sight and out
of mind?
In the case of surface flows, can a state prevent an out-of-state user
from coming into a state, buying surface waters, and transporting those
waters for use out of state? An example of this might be the Galloway
proposal of San Diego to buy surface water in Colorado and transport it
to California via the Colorado River.42 On the other hand, would a state
be unable to prevent an out-of-state user from coming into a state, buying
40. Id.
41. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 467 (1922).
42. Simison, Debate is Growing Over a Proposal to Sell Water from Colorado River, Wall St.
J., Nov. 19, 1984, at 33, col. 1-3.
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groundwater, and transporting it for use out of state via a pipeline? An
example of this situation might be the El Paso case."
Why does the court, when dealing with interstate surface waters, speak
of the need for caution in regard to the "relative rights of states"" and
"the interests of quasi-sovereigns, "4 5 but when dealing with groundwater
speak of the freeflow of "articles in commerce"? Why did the Court
"erase the stateline" in Sporhase,46 and reenforce it in Vermejo?47 These
questions may, but probably do not, have answers; they do indicate some
perplexing incongruities.
PracticalUncertainties
At first blush, the Court appears in fact to have provided a route for
harmonizing the two doctrines of interstate water allocation. In the Sporhase case, the Supreme Court recognized that apportionment is one of
the circumstances under which a "state may restrict water within its
borders."" As a result, it appears that the Supreme Court recognizes
apportionment as an exception to the commerce clause;49 that under the
commerce clause a state basically cannot restrict the use of water to use
within its own borders except, for example, if the water is state-owned
or has been allocated to that state under an apportionment. There could
be, however, at least two different scenarios which would determine
whether the apportionment exception will be meaningful in fact.
The Undercutting of Apportionment or What the Left Hand Giveth the
Right Hand Taketh Away
The practical effect of the exception of apportionment under a compact
may be largely illusory. Why should a state desiring groundwater from
another state bother to negotiate for a share of the aquifer under an
apportionment if it can take all it wants under the commerce clause? The
Court has repeatedly said it wants the parties themselves to try to settle
their interstate water disputes through negotiation before it will decide
43. El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
44. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
45. Id,
46. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982).
47. E. Clyde, Remarks at American Bar Assn. Section of Natural Resources Law (Jan. 8-9, 1985,
San Diego, CA.).
48. 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). Apportionment is achieved either by mutual agreement of the
parties under a compact, such as the Rio Grande Compact of 1938, Pub. L. No. 96, 53 Stat. 785
(May 31, 1939); an equitable apportionment action before the U.S. Supreme Court, such as Nebraska
v.Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); or by Congress, such as the Boulder Canyon Project Act on the
Colorado River, 43 U.S.C. §§617-617n (1983). The term "equitable apportionment" is used generically in this article for any of these methods of apportionment.
49. This statement is greatly simplified since there are many arguable issues yet to be settled,
such as how explicit does the congressional language have to be in a compact.
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the dispute through equitable apportionment." However, if the Court itself
is going to use the commerce clause rather than equitable apportionment
in groundwater cases, then there may be no incentive to negotiate compacts because the demanding state can obtain all it wants under the
commerce clause rather than settling for a mere share. 5
Other Contradictions
Another contradiction might include the following example: In the case
of transboundary aquifers (see map II), under equitable apportionment
each state sharing the aquifer is allocated a fair share. This allocation
prevents State B from unilaterally taking actions within its territory which
will have significant detrimental impacts in State A. That is, State B
cannot deprive State A of a fair share of the use of the waters of the
aquifer. State B is not entitled to more than a fair share, even though its
actions, i.e., the pumping and use of the water, occur within its own
territory. However, under the commerce clause, why should State B be
concerned or inhibited about withdrawals within its own territory which
might impact detrimentally on State A if it can go directly into the territory
of State A and take directly what water it wants? (See map IV infra)
A response might be that there are other limitations on State B, for
example, State B would be limited by applicable laws of State A such
as those on water quality, and non-impairment of existing water rights.
But then would State B, if it chose to put its wells down within its own
territory rather than in the territory of State A, be subject to the laws of
impairment and water quality of State A within State B's own territory?
That is, would the laws of State A be given extra-territorial effect and be
applied in State B? How would State A enforce its laws and supervise
their administration on an ongoing basis in State B? It would perhaps be
better to avoid these tortuous complexities through an equitable apportionment with a federal-state compact commission supervising the administration of each state's allocation and the protection of water quality from
activities which may have detrimental transboundary impacts.
50. The United States Supreme Court made the point clearly in a water quality case when it
stated: "We cannot withhold the suggestion ... that the grave problem of sewage disposal ... is
one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession
on the part of the representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any
court however constituted." New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1930). The Court, in Colorado
v. Kansas, further elaborated:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases
is that . . . they involve the interests of quasi sovereigns, . . . of interstate differences
of a like nature, that such mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible,
be the medium of settlement instead of the invocation of our adjudicatorypower.
320 U.S. 383 (1943) (emphasis added).
51. Negotiation has never been easy at best (Fischer, Management of Interstate Groundwater, 7
NAT. REsouRcEs LAw 521 (1973)) and with the incentive perhaps removed by the Sporhase case,
it may be impossible to negotiate a compact.
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Toward an Integrated Doctrine of Interstate Water Law
The existing uncertainty and disarray of interstate water law demonstrates a need to harmonize the treatment of transboundary ground and
surface waters under a consistent and unified doctrine. This integrating
doctrine will have to accommodate the needs of the union and the needs
of individual states. In selecting an approach to balance these competing
needs, decisionmakers should choose one which:
1) would not grant absolute territorial sovereignty to individual states;
2) would not allow states to determine unilaterally the allocation of
the use of interstate water resources;
3) would recognize the limited territorial sovereignty and needs of
individual member states;
4) would recognize land and water as a part of the territorial base and,
therefore, as essential to the territorial integrity of individual member
states;
5) would require individual states to share fairly interstate surface and
groundwaters; and
6) would recognize the need to manage conjunctively interstate surface
and groundwaters which are hydrologically interrelated.
The established federal common law doctrine of equitable apportionment provides a conceptual tool for balancing the needs of the federation
and the needs of the constituent states. It provides the basis for the
development of a cohesive, integrated interstate water law for the use of
surface and groundwaters.
An integrated interstate water law would be as follows:
1) Transboundary surface flows would be governed by the doctrine of
equitable apportionment. Allocation could be by mutual agreement, decision of the Supreme Court, or congressional action.
2) The use of the waters of transboundary aquifers likewise would be
governed by the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
3) Aquifers located totally within the territorial limits of one state, but
interrelated to transboundary streams, could be exploited by that state
only to the extent that existing obligations to deliver surface waters are
not impaired.
4) Aquifers which are neither transboundary nor interrelated with transboundary surface flows would be subject to the jurisdiction and agreement
of the state of which they form a part. 2 Such an approach would provide
a consistent conceptual structure for interstate water resources.
52. Pragmatically, this probably is not an important category, but if transboundary surface waters
and transboundary groundwaters are to be treated consistently and "governed" by equitable apportionment under which each state is allocated its share of the use of the stream or aquifer, as the case
may be, then it would be inconsistent if aquifers totally within the territorial limits of a state (those
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Greater Simplicity and Certainty
In addition to the considerations of protecting balance within the federation and providing stability for water planning, there is the factor of
simplicity. The use of the doctrine of equitable apportionment could
simplify and harmonize interstate water law and avoid the contradictions
inherent in using commerce clause analysis for groundwater. Groundwater
and surface water would be treated consistently-rather than the use of
surface flows being governed by equitable apportionment, and the use of
groundwaters by the commerce clause. A unified law of interstate waters
could avoid some of the complexities of trying to balance the public
welfare needs of "arid states" and other states under Sporhase. Sporhase
held that "water is an article of commerce" and therefore commerce
clause analysis prevents a state from controlling "water within its borders. "" However, it immediately was compelled to suggest a confusing
list of "certain circumstances" under which "each state may restrict water
within its borders. . . . "4 The Court suggested, for example, that:
1) A state may "conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital
resource in times of severe shortage," but only for "the purpose of
protecting the health of its citizens" not "the health of its economy." 55
2) A state may favor its own citizens in times of shortage if there are
"some indicia that the water is publicly produced and owned."56
3) A state may impose preservation and conservation
restrictions if the
'57
state "as a whole suffers a water shortage.
4) A state might establish a "total ban on the exportation of water" if
a state is "demonstrably arid."" 8
aquifers which are neither transboundary nor tributary to transboundary streams) were governed by
the commerce clause.
This would turn the logic of equitable apportionment on its head. It would mean the more
completely an aquifer is located within the territory of a state, the less regulatory control that state
would have over it. The farther an aquifer is from the political periphery, the less control the state
within which it is located would have. The logic of equitable apportionment is just the opposite. As
one progresses toward the boundary, a state has to limit its ability to act unilaterally in regard to
water resources. It has to share transboundary water resources; it cannot take all, it can take only
a share, but it does have a share.
Thus, equitable apportionment is rooted in the principle that water resources are part of the territorial
base of a state. However, that concept of territorial sovereignty or integrity must be limited when
that resource is transboundary. Neither State A nor State B can act unilaterally in the allocation of
resources which they share in common because those resources are transboundary. Conversely, those
aquifers which are not transboundary are completely within the territorial base of the state. They
are, therefore, under the jurisdiction and control of the state within which they are located.
53. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982).
54. Id. at 956.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 957.
57. Id. at 958.
58. Id.
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5) A state may exercise "a limited preference for its own citizens in
utilization of the resources" if it is protecting the public welfare.59
This in turn forced the court in the El Paso case to struggle with
considering when "a state may prefer its own citizens" even though
"Sporhase did not delineate the extent."' The court valiantly grappled
with the question of when a state may "limit water exports to protect the
'public welfare' of its citizens. "6 Pursuant to Sporhase the El Paso court
knew it had to avoid a definition of "public interest" which allowed
protection of "merely" economic interests, even though it recognized
"the health of the state's economy has a direct bearing on the public
welfare of its citizens," 62 and nearly "every aspect of public welfare has
economic overtones. ,63
The court ended up concluding that economic interests are an inextricable part of public welfare of a state's citizens in that public welfare
includes "health, safety, recreational, aesthetic, environmental, and economic interests. "' Therefore, if the state prefers its own citizens to protect
their public welfare, it may do so even if this includes protecting economic
interests so long as this is "only incidental ' 61 to the protection of the
general public welfare, and if the court after trying "to accommodate the
competing local and national interests"
concludes that there are no "less
66
burdensome alternatives available. ,
The El Paso court also addressed the question of when may a state
"favor its own citizens in times and places of shortage." 67 Must it wait
until the shortage actually exists, or may it prefer local usage while there
is still water to conserve in anticipation of a shortage? The court concluded
that the answers to these questions and others relating to when and whether
a state can prefer its own citizens "cannot be evaluated in a vacuum"
and have to be decided on a case by case basis. 68 This kind of case by
case evaluation is nothing new to the courts, but will lead to complexity
and extended and frequent litigation which will be expensive both to the
parties and to the courts.
Thus the courts following Sporhase are faced with trying to make the
free market concept of the commerce clause work while simultaneously
considering the special circumstances of individual states. Equitable ap59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 955.
El Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.M. 1984).
Id. at 698.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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portionment would be simpler to understand and easier to administer. In
addition, by allocating to each state a definable share it would provide
certainty with which the contending states can plan for growth, shortages,
and the future. Under both the commerce clause and equitable apportionment, a consideration of a variety of factors is required. But in the
case of water, under equitable apportionment there is a long established
experience and a well structured concept which, if applied to subsurface
as well as surface waters, would provide a consistent legal doctrine for
interstate waters and would provide states with the assurance of a quantifiable share.
CONCLUSION
Sporhase was a pioneering, first attempt of the court to grapple with
interstate groundwater disputes, but should not preclude further thinking
and development of interstate groundwater law. This first step down the
road of the commerce clause should not prevent the court from building
on its already established practice and experience with interstate streams
to construct an integrated law of interstate waters. In so doing, it can
avoid the contradictions and inconsistencies of a fragmented approach
which follows one legal doctrine for surface flows and another for subsurface waters-a duality which defies the laws of hydrology, not to
mention the interests of good federalism and good planning.
The Court should choose the already established path of interstate water
allocation, and clearly declare that the federal common law doctrine of
equitable apportionment "governs" '69 the use of both interstate surface
and groundwaters. This would serve four important goals. It would:
69. Vermejo I at 183. If the legislative approach were taken as an alternative, legislation might
be something like the following example:
AN ACT TO REGULATE THE ALLOCATION OF INTERSTATE WATERS
The Congress hereby finds and declares that:
1. Each of the states has an interest in water resources occurring within its boundaries which is
unique;
2. The use of interstate waters should be shared equitably;
3. No one state or region should be able to determine its share of transboundary groundwaters
unilaterally, either because of superior geographic position, or economic position;
4. The share should be determined by mutual agreement, judicial decision, or congressional action
based on equitable principles;
5. Stability for expectations should be assured so as to provide a secure climate for the long-term
management and preservation of the resource;
6. It is in the national interest that there be a coherent and integrated law for interstate surface
and groundwaters.
The allocation of interstate waters shall be as follows:
1.The use of interstate surface flows shall be governed by the federal common law doctrine of
equitable apportionment. Each state's share shall be determined by mutual agreement, decision of
the Supreme Court, or congressional action.
2. The use of the waters of transboundary aquifers shall be governed by the federal common law
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1. Protect the federation by requiring sharing;
2. Protect the integrity of individual members of the federation by
assuring that they may retain an equitable share;

3. Provide stability of expectations necessary for state and regional
water planning;
4. Provide a simplified and integrated interstate water law.
Given the two opposing concepts, it is difficult to categorically declare
that one is in all ways absolutely superior to the other, but at the minimum
it can be suggested that equitable apportionment is not a bad accommodation. It limits the excesses of territorial chauvinism by requiring
sharing, while at the same time allowing state and regional planning and
conservation for future growth and shortages.

doctrine of equitable apportionment. Each state's share shall be determined by mutual agreement,
decision of the Supreme Court, or congressional action.
3. Aquifers located totally within the territorial limits of one state, but tributary to an interstate
stream, can be exploited by that state only to the extent that existing compact or treaty obligations
to deliver surface waters are not impaired.
4. Aquifers which are neither interstate nor tributary to interstate surface flows are subject to the
jurisdiction and control of the state of which they form a part.
Nothing in this Act shall:
(a) Alter in any way the rights of any state under present and future interstate compacts, Supreme
Court decrees or Acts of Congress;
(b) Preempt or modify any state or federal laws or interstate compact dealing with water quality;
(c) Affect the federal reserved water rights of any Indian tribe or other entity, or alter in any way
any water rights or usage with relation to any congressionally authorized federal water project.
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AN INTEGRATED INTERSTATE WATER LAW
I. The use of waters of a drainage basin normally must be apportioned
between the coriparians. No one party may unilaterally determine its
own share.

II. The use of the waters of the aquifer normally must be apportioned
between the parties which overlie it; and no one party may unilaterally
determine its own share. Neither state can take more than its equitable
share. For example, State B cannot take the share of State A by
pumping within its own territory.

III. State A may use the aquifer only to the extent that deliveries of
surface waters under existing agreements governing surface waters
are not impaired.
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IV. State B may not take water from State A by pumping from a source
in State A, except by mutual agreement.

State
B

